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Stratification and Attainment in a Large Japanese Firm 
This paper investigate the attainment process in a large Japanese financial service company. 
Unlike firms in the U.S., hires into the "permanent" category of workers in a Japanese company 
tend to be homogeneous with regard to age of entry, (lack of) prior experience, education, and 
gender. This raises an issue of how, in such circumstances, a firm selects employees for 
advancement and what is the structure of the promotion process. 
It has been suggested that a formal description of the attainment process is conveyed by 
Rosenbaum's "tournament model of careers." We investigate whether this imagery is consistent 
with the data on careers in the firm, we conclude that such a model is not descriptive of the 
attainment process; rather advancement is more properly characterized as a "gatekeeping" 
operation (at an early career stage), followed by delayed selection of the eventual corporate elite. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Japanese management policy has been a source of keen fascination to 
social scientists in the United States. Many issues relating to the 
organization of efficient, high quality production and delivery of 
services have been resolved in a manner that is believed to be quite 
different from U.S. formulations. Japanese industry, for example, has 
instituted practices such as quality control circles, just-in-time 
delivery, affiliated satellite firms, and contracting out arrangements— 
administrative structures that have few precedents in the United States. 
The human resource systems of large companies in Japan are also 
characterized by practices quite different from those in U.S. firms, both 
in the assumed employment relation and in the approach taken to career 
development. Notions of life-time employment, hiring "permanent" workers 
directly from school, the rarity of lateral entry, the seniority reward 
system (nenko), and salary compression are some of the features that are 
distinctive to personnel management in Japan (Cole 1979; Koike 1988). 
This is not to suggest that these practices are entirely absent from U.S. 
firms, but it is rare for several to appear in the same company, though 
IBM in past decades may have been an exception (Foy 1975). In large 
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Japanese companies these features tend to be components of an integrated 
personnel system, possibly reinforced by cultural norms that stress 
social harmony, primacy of corporate goals over individual aspirations, 
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and deference to elders (Dore 1973, pp. 51-52, 297-298; Koike 1988, pp. 
4-7; Roland 1988, pp. 72-75; but also see Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990). 
When examining the human resource system of a Japanese firm one can 
readily observe how some of the component features are knit together and 
work in tandem, as well as identify strains in an otherwise coherent set 
of personnel practices. Contracting-out arrangements, for example, 
facilitate a policy of lifetime employment by permitting fluctuations in 
product demand to be passed on to an affiliated satellite firm (Dore 
1973, p. 39). An early mandatory retirement age—55 to 60 is the common 
range—often followed by rehiring the superannuated worker (at a lower 
wage) provides additional flexibility to a firm in adjusting to the 
economic cycle, since the rehired worker is no longer protected by the 
"lifetime" commitment. 
A decision to offer lifetime employment carries several 
implications. First, personnel selection must be done with great care 
since a strategy of disposing of workers who later reveal themselves to 
be poor performers is not available to management. Second, where 
lifetime employment is coupled with a linkage of salary to seniority, 
worker motivation and wage cost containment can become problems since 
management is denied the use of some potent behavioral reinforcers. 
Third, although lateral entry is not formally foreclosed by a policy of 
lifetime employment, when many firms follow this practice few mid-level 
job changers are likely to be available for recruitment. These 
considerations heighten the importance of training and socialization. 
The skills that will be required by a company have to be developed 
internally; moreover, future corporate leaders must be selected and 
groomed from the young recruits (Peck and Tamura 1976; OECD 1973; Cole 
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1979, pp. 40-42). This circumstance helps explain the long-term 
relationships with particular schools that are often sought by employers, 
since the educational institutions can evaluate students on the basis of 
several years of observation (Rosenbaum and Kariya 1989). 
Tensions arise because some personnel practices do not mesh well 
with others. For example, the socialization of managerial recruits is 
intended to instill commitment to the firm and reinforce cohort bonding 
(Dore 1973, pp. 46-54). Identification with the firm, rather than with a 
subunit, is promoted by a policy of rotating employees among occupational 
tasks and organizational units; in practice, encouraging a "generalist" 
orientation (Hirono 1969, pp. 260-61). According to Ballon (1969a, p. 
26), job rotation is essential for advancement to senior management. 
Yet, large firms must also develop specialists, and economic rationality 
suggests that such individuals be encouraged to work within the domain of 
their expertise. We know little about how specialization is motivated or 
rewarded in a work context that is largely geared to promoting a 
generalist orientation, though see Koike (1991) and Pucik (1964a) for 
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some insights into the career implications of specialization. 
Similarly, the selection of employees for advancement to senior 
positions entails a process of differentiation among cohort members—a 
problematic activity in a context in which cohesion is prized. There is 
some consensus to the effect that these conflicting objectives are 
managed by segregating them in time. Solidarity is emphasized during the 
first decade or so of employment, facilitated by a policy of automatic 
promotion through the junior ranks. Only afterwards does differentiation 
begin in earnest, with some employees earmarked for high administrative 
ranks (Clark 1979, p. 112-119; Yoshino and Lifson 1986, pp. 146-147). 
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How this process unfolds is not clearly understood. Following 
Rosenbaum (1984), Pucik (1985, p.77) contends that after the first decade 
of employment attainment can be described by a "tournament model," in 
which employees who have advanced rapidly from one rank have sharply 
higher prospects for swift promotion in the subsequent rank (see Hanada 
1987 for a similar assessment). In Rosenbaum's formulation (1984, pp. 
61-62), early winners—measured by rapid promotion in the initial ranks— 
have an opportunity to compete for high statuses, while losers can 
compete only for lesser jobs. A derivative feature of the tournament 
model of careers is its weakness in accommodating "errors of exclusion." 
It lacks a mechanism for bringing early losers back into the competition 
for senior positions (Rosenbaum 1984, p. 288). 
Ballon has suggested a very different decision calculus, one in 
which productivity in the early ranks is not a dominating consideration 
in later promotion decisions. The question for Ballon is what is meant 
by productivity? "[I]n Japan economic performance is not so much a 
matter of individual employees as [it is] of an entire organization" 
(Ballon 1969a, p.26). Promotion, in turn, is less tied to the details of 
work performance than to "proper organizational values." These are 
expected to mature with age and tend to reveal themselves only in late 
career stages. Assuming, then, that rapid advancement in the early ranks 
reflects individual productivity, one prediction from Ballon's thesis is 
that slow initial mobility may not be a handicap in later promotion 
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decisions. 
There is also the related issue of the consequence of advancement 
and how the effects of loss in the career competition are managed. This 
is a serious issue in a context of "lifetime employment" because a worker 
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who has been passed over for promotion must still be motivated to perform 
effectively in lower ranked positions. The fact that the seniority 
component of salary is often large in Japanese firms (Cole 1979, p. 41; 
Okochi, et. al. 1974, pp. 499-500) operates to mitigate the problem, 
since this arrangement limits the material effects of loss. Clark (1979, 
p. 122) also describes a set of titles accorded to employees on the basis 
of seniority—"honorable consolation prizes"—but which lack the 
authority that derives from high rank in the principal status hierarchy 
of the firm. 
In this paper we examine the related themes of status advancement 
and compensation level in a large Japanese company in the mid-1990's. We 
organize the analysis around the following specific issues: (a) What are 
the determinants of promotion and how do they vary by rank in the firm? 
(b) What is the consequence of status attainment (relative to the effect 
of seniority) for remuneration level? (c) What kind of conceptual 
imagery—e.g., Rosenbaum's tournament model; Ballon's formulation—best 
describes the way that opportunity and advancement are structured for 
employees? 
The information for this study comes from the employee data base of 
one of the ten largest financial service companies in Japan. Our data 
set is unusually rich in that we have complete work histories of 
employees current as of 1993, which permits personnel issues to be 
addressed in some detail using the methods of survival analysis. 
Moreover, while we have emphasized career features that are fairly 
distinctive to Japan, there have been suggestions of change and a trend 
toward adoption of practices common in western countries—in both salary 
determination and promotion policy (Marsh and Mannari 1976, p. 120; 
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Yoshino and Lifson 1986, pp. 152-155; Wolferen and Murphy 1994, p. IV-
13). Because the firm we have studied is considered by its officers to 
be fairly typical of large companies (in the financial service sector) in 
its human resource practices, by examining the extent to which our 
findings deviate from earlier accounts of Japanese work systems we can 
also assess the evidence for change and convergence to western 
arrangements. 
II. THE STRATIFICATION SYSTEM FOR MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES 
Before turning to the analysis of rank advancement and salary 
determination, it is useful to outline the main features of the 
stratification system of the Japanese firm. Also, for a reference 
standard, we compare the Japanese company with a large financial service 
organization in the U.S., which has been studied in some detail 
(Spilerman and Lunde 1992; Petersen and Spilerman 1990). 
Analogous to the U.S. firm, the Japanese company is divided into 
clerical and managerial specialties. However, (1) all clerical workers 
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are women and almost all managerial employees are men. In the U.S. 
firm, by comparison, women constitute 91% of clerical workers and 46% of 
administrative employees. (2) In the Japanese company there is no 
mobility across the clerical/managerial divide; recruits to the 
managerial ranks come directly from college. In the U.S. firm, in 
contrast, there are extensive "posting and bidding" provisions to 
facilitate job transfers, and these have resulted in approximately half 
of managerial entrants coming from the clerical ranks of the company. 
Regarding entrants from the external labor market into the 
managerial ranks, in the U.S. firm some 55% have had prior work 
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experience, a background that is rare in the Japanese company. In the 
U.S., new managerial hires exhibit differences in level of educational 
attainment, which is not the case in Japan where all entrants have a 
college degree. (3) In Japan, there is a distinction between "non-
permanent" and "permanent" workers, which is virtually coterminous with 
the clerical/managerial dichotomy. Only permanent employees are promised 
lifetime employment. 
To summarize, in the Japanese firm managerial employees are male; 
they have been recruited directly from college; they comprise an entering 
cohort that is homogeneous in age and in education; and most expect to 
spend their full working lives within the company. Clerical employees, 
in comparison, are female, usually without a college degree. They are 
not recruited into the managerial ranks and their tenure with the firm 
normally ends with marriage or childbirth. The significance of this 
distinction in the personnel categories is conveyed by the fact that the 
employee data base of the Japanese company contains work histories of 
only managerial employees. Hence, our investigation is restricted to 
managerial employees and to men. 
It should also be emphasized that the sort of analysis a student of 
careers can do with the Japanese materials is less rich than what is 
commonly undertaken with U.S. data. In the study of the U.S. financial 
service company, for example, much of the research effort was devoted to 
examining the effects on attainment of gender, years of schooling, entry 
age, and entry portal (promotion from the clerical grades versus entry by 
a new hire directly into the managerial ranks). In the Japanese company, 
however, there is little variation on any of these variables. Indeed, 
this tendency to homogeneity of an entry cohort—a frustration to the 
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researcher—combined with the practice of encouraging a "generalist 
orientation," facilitates the common corporate policy of rewarding 
employees principally on the basis of seniority. If there is little 
differentiation on other human capital variables, the significance of 
seniority as a determinant of productivity and performance is heightened. 
The structure of rewards. In large work places in the U.S. the 
reward structure is commonly based on the principles of modern 
compensation design (e.g., Wallace and Fay 1983; Sibson 1981). The 
essential features of such human resource systems are a set of ranked 
salary grades (there are 20 in the U.S. company), the slotting of job 
titles into the grade levels on the basis of a job evaluation procedure, 
and a definition of promotion as an upward movement in the salary grade 
structure, rather than in terms of a change in job title. As remarked 
elsewhere (Spilerman and Petersen 1994), the attractiveness of this 
arrangement is that it frees management from the tyranny of a 
technologically determined occupational distribution that constrains 
promotion allocations to the presence of "vacancies." In the salary 
grade formulation management can more easily award promotions on the 
basis of merit. Lacking a vacancy, a job title can either be 
reclassified into a higher grade or the number of grades associated with 
the position can be increased. 
In comparison, the reward structure in the Japanese company has 
three distinct dimensions. First, there is a system of status ranks 
(often referred to as "standard ranks" [e.g., Clark 1979, p. 104]), a 
hierarchy which lacks a counterpart in U.S. industry. The standard 
ranks—titles such as department head, section head, sub-section head— 
adhere to the individual and are not necessarily descriptive of the job 
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he does. The standard ranks are fairly universal in Japan; as a result 
the titles convey meaning throughout the society about an individual's 
status and provide a basis for social comparisons among employees of 
different firms. In the U.S. the closest parallel is status in the 
military, in which rank conveys authority and patterns deference 
relationships but is not indicative of an officer's job assignment. 
The second dimensions relates to functional responsibility in the 
company—one's managerial authority. While there is a correspondence 
between this dimension and standard rank, they are not formally 
identical. Clark (1979, pp. 111-115), for example, describes an 
organizational setting in which senior level supervisory positions are 
sometimes left unfilled, in order to permit capable junior employees to 
take on duties normally associated with high standard rank, which they 
lack the tenure to acquire. As Dore (1973, p. 68) notes, "[t]he 
advantage of this flexible system is that it allows faithful service by 
men of mediocre ability to be rewarded by an increase in rank without the 
disadvantage of dysfunctionally promoting them to positions of greater 
authority." 
The third dimension concerns salary grade. The U.S. financial 
service company utilizes a set of 20 grades, essentially a system of 
overlapping salary ranges. In the Japanese company which we examined 
there are 34 grades, each of which specifies a base salary rate that is 
adjusted for seniority. More consequential is the different significance 
of the salary grade hierarchy in the two countries. As noted earlier, in 
the U.S. company salary grade constitutes a unified reward dimension. 
There are no "personal" status ranks; also, the job titles—which convey 
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functional responsibilities—are mapped onto the salary grades. 
Promotion, in turn, is defined as movement in this grade hierarchy. 
In contrast, in the tripartite division of the Japanese company, 
standard rank constitutes the central factor in the allocation of status, 
authority, and career rewards (Rohlen 1974; p. 25). Also, promotion is 
defined in terms of movement within this hierarchy. While salary grade 
is correlated with standard rank, the former is often tied to seniority, 
especially at the beginning of the career (Dore 1973, p. 68; Rohlen 1974, 
p.156). Indeed, this emphasis on seniority in the setting of salary— 
rather than job assignment—is rational in an environment in which job 
rotation is encouraged and employment is long-term. While a worker's 
wages might not reflect his specific job duties at a given time point, 
the compensation model—as well as notions of equity and employee 
expectations—is formulated in terms of lifetime career rewards, not 
statically (Yoshino and Lifson 1986, p. 152; Koike 1988, p. 134). 
Since the system of standard ranks is the principal dimension of 
stratification in the Japanese firm, we have focused our investigation on 
mobility within this status hierarchy. Because of the complex relation 
between compensation and status rank—high remuneration is both a reward 
for attainment and, possibly, a consolation prize as well for passed-over 
employees—we also examine the consequence of rank attainment for 
compensation level. 
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III. THE ATTAINMENT PROCESS IN THE FIRM 
In Table 1 we present cross-sectional information on the 
distribution of personnel in the management ranks in 1993 (column 1). 
From the duration figures (column 3) it is evident that a long period is 
spent in the "non-management" or "trainee" status and that there is 
little variation in duration in this rank (column 4, row 1). This 
finding is consistent with the reports of other investigators (e.g., 
Yoshino and Lifson 1986, 146; Pucik 1985, p. 74), who have noted that the 
trainee period lasts from 10-15 years and that promotion is automatic 
after a fixed interval in this status. (We shall, however, have more to 
say about this assessment.) The figures in column (5) provide rough 
evidence for the stability of the organization in size and in status 
distribution, indicating that turnover in ranks 20 to 40 has been fairly 
constant at about 110 persons/year. In ranks 20 and 30 this turnover 
consists largely of promotions; however, many of the exits from rank 40 
are retirements and hence the decline in turnover in the highest 
positions. 
Table 1 about here 
Which variables predict to promotion? This issue is addressed in 
Table 2 using Cox's proportional hazard model (Blossfeld, Hamerle and 
Mayer 1989, chap. 3) with career history data from the 1961-82 entry 
cohorts. The Cox model specifies that 
where X' is a vector of covariates, B is the vector of respective 
regression coefficients, t is the waiting time to promotion, and hg(t) is 
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an unspecified base rate that is the same for all individuals. To permit 
the possibility that the determinants vary with level in the 
organization, we examined promotions from ranks 20, 30, and 40 
separately. Thus, the regressions in each panel are based on spells in 
the particular rank. An employee can contribute only one spell to a 
panel; however, if he has progressed through several ranks he can 
contribute a spell to more than one panel. In each model, the regressors 
predict to the rate of promotion from the noted rank; incomplete spells 
as of July 1993--the data collection date--are treated as censored 
observations. 
Table 2 about here 
For reasons outlined earlier--the homogeneity of managerial 
recruits in terms of educational attainment, gender, and (absence of) 
prior work experience--the available regressors are few. Nonetheless, 
some distinctive patterns emerge. With respect to advancement from the 
"non-management" status (Panel A), neither age at hire (on which there is 
a range of some 3 years) nor college major predicts to promotion. 
However, the models in columns (3) and (4) indicate a negative 
association between size of an entry cohort and the promotion rate, which 
would suggest a corporate policy of insulating the higher ranks from 
annual variations in magnitude of the intake. This finding would seem at 
variance with the contention that promotion from rank 20 is "automatic;" 
however, we will shortly make clear that even at this early career point 
the company has begun to make distinctions among employees as well as to 
fine-tune the advancement regime. 
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In the analysis of promotion from rank 30 (Panel B), we introduce a 
regressor for duration in the prior rank. This term is intended to 
assess whether individuals who have previously advanced rapidly are 
advantaged with respect to current promotion prospects. The significant 
negative coefficient that we find--long prior duration reduces the 
promotion rate--supports this possibility (column 1). One explanation 
for the finding would emphasize the sorting of workers on the basis of 
either tournament success or ability (unmeasured in our data set); 
however, these initial results are also consistent with a tracking or 
gate-keeping explanation. 
Further insight into the mechanics of the attainment process can be 
obtained from an analysis of promotion in rank 40 (Panel C). These 
results provide support for a "tracking" type of explanation. In 
particular, while we continue to find a significant negative coefficient 
for time in rank 20, there is no effect of duration in rank 30, the prior 
status level (column 1). This result is not consistent with an "ability 
sorting" thesis or with a "tournament" model; both would suggest that 
recent job performance--indexed here by duration in prior rank--should 
have greater impact on promotion chances than less proximate performance 
measures. Instead, our results suggest a process in which a critical 
evaluation is made early in an employee's career and it is this decision, 
rather than later job performance, which determines the worker's 
subsequent promotion prospects. 
Finally, we note from columns (3) and (4) of the several panels 
that entry cohort size has no impact on the promotion rate after the 
trainee years (rank 20). In contrast, college major, which has little 
effect during the trainee years--possibly because new recruits follow a 
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generalist career path--attains significance at higher organizational 
levels, where specialization is more common (Suzuki 1981), with a 
business/law major predicting to early advancement. Thus, what can be 
said from these data is that trainee assessments--as indexed by duration 
in rank 20--have a profound effect on advancement prospects over the 
career course and that, in the higher corporate ranks, college major also 
predicts to promotion. As to the individual-level variables which 
discriminate among employees during the trainee period--surely an 
interesting question--we have no information. Because of the homogeneity 
of new recruits on most observable human capital measures and the absence 
of a work history during the trainee period, we lack variables that might 
differentiate among employees in this early career stage. 
Compensation level. The second dimension in our description of the 
stratification process concerns the determinants of monthly salary. 
There is some consensus that, at least in past decades, seniority has 
constituted the principal consideration in the calculation of salary 
level in large Japanese firms (Marsh and Mannari 1976, pp. 154-156; 
Yoshino and Lifson 1986, pp. 152-153). Moreover, we have argued that 
such an arrangement meshes well with several distinctive features of 
industrial organization in Japan: little differentiation among workers on 
human capital measures; a practice of rotating employees among jobs; and 
a need to mitigate the consequence of failure in the promotion 
competition. A policy that pegs compensation to seniority would appear 
consistent with these organizational practices. At the same time, other 
researchers (e.g., Cole 1971, pp. 81-84; Clark 1979, pp. 154-155) have 
suggested that Japanese firms have been moving away from a largely 
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seniority based reward structure to job specific payments and performance 
wages. 
In a large Japanese firm an employee's compensation level is the 
sum of several components: base salary, rank supplements, family and 
commuting allowances, and a bonus payment. In the following analysis, we 
limit our consideration to the base salary component (which includes 
o 
additions for seniority) and the rank supplements. OLS regressions of 
monthly compensation (in July 1993) are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3 about here 
The coefficients in column (1) show the effects of seniority and 
status rank on log monthly salary. In this semi-log specification, 
exponentials of the rank coefficients can be interpreted as multiplier 
terms. Thus, holding seniority constant, the cumulative salary returns 
to rank--relative to the base category (rank 30)--are: an 8.5% increase 
in rank 40 (i.e., a 1.085 multiplier), a 15.8% increase in rank 50, and a 
23.6% increment in rank 60. In comparison, holding rank constant, the 
cumulative salary returns to tenure at the 10, 20, and 30 year points 
are, respectively, increments of 77%, 145%, and 168% over entry salary. 
Columns (2) and (3) report more complex models of the salary 
determination process. In column (3) terms have been added for duration 
in rank and for interactions between this variable and the rank dummies. 
o 
Because of the high correlation between duration and (duration) , a 
9 linear specification of this variable is used. 
Because the rank effects are now function of duration, in order to 
compare the returns to seniority with the returns to status level one 
must assess the latter at different duration times. At the 20 year 
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point, the return to seniority is a 170% increase over entry salary; at 
the 30 year point it is little different: a 182% increment. The 
additional salary return to rank, as duration ranges for instance from 
zero to five years, is the following: In rank 40, relative to the 
omitted category (rank 30), it varies from 5.1% for recent rank entrants 
to 9.6% at the five year point. In rank 50, the range is 14.8% to 26.2%, 
and in rank 60 it is 22.1% to 38.3%. While these returns to status rank 
are hardly inconsequential, they are small in comparison with the 
increase tied to tenure, especially over the first 20 years of 
employment. 
To summarize, our results are consistent with the reports of other 
investigators in several key respects: We find that (a) seniority plays 
a dominant role in compensation determination, especially during the 
first two decades of employment (Pucik 1984b, p. 92); (b) promotion and 
rank differentials become important for salary growth after this tenure 
point (Yoshino an Lifson 1986, p. 154); and (c) there is evidence of 
salary compression, in comparison with western compensation practices 
(Pucik 1984a, p. 272; 1974b, p. 92). In particular, the most highly paid 
rank 60 manager in our data set received 2.3 times the salary of a 
beginning rank 30 employee; in the U.S. financial service company the 
comparable multiplier is approximately 5.0. 
The salary practices we have observed in 1993 are not very 
different from descriptions published several decades ago (e.g., Ballon 
1969a, chap.6; Cole 1971, chap. 3), despite suggestions of an impending 
shift to a more western mode of compensation (e.g., Clark 1979, p. 155; 
Yoshino and Lifson 1986, pp. 152-155).ll This stability is not 
surprising to us because the compensation strategy of a firm cannot be 
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isolated from other deeply rooted personnel practices. Rather, it is a 
key element in a system whose components include a low variance in human 
capital variables at employment entry, a generalist orientation during 
the training period, an emphasis on solidarity, and lifetime employment. 
Seniority-based compensation by a firm is economically rational in the 
early years of a cohort's tenure because there is little employee 
differentiation; it is also a reasonable policy in the later years, after 
differentiation has taken place, as it limits the consequence of 
"failure." In a context of lifetime employment this has to be a critical 
consideration since commitment and performance must be motivated for the 
less successful employee. 
IV. FORMULATIONS OF RANK ADVANCEMENT 
What sort of conceptual imagery best describes the attainment 
process in the Japanese company? Should it be viewed as (a) a tournament 
model, (b) a process of cumulative advantage, (c) an example of 
"sponsored mobility," (d) a gatekeeping operation, or (e) as an instance 
of "contest mobility," in which the criteria for promotion to a senior 
position could be quite different from judgments about performance in low 
ranks? Our data set is not sufficiently rich to distinguish definitively 
among these alternative explanations, though we are in a position to rule 
out some. Moreover, while the conceptual imageries may appear distinct 
when characterized by terse descriptions, once the explanations are 
operationalized the predictions from several of the formulations tend to 
overlap. In particular, models (a) and (b) are difficult to disentangle; 
the same is true for models (c) and (d). 
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In its simplest form, the tournament model describes a sequence of 
contests in which only winners advance to the next round. According to 
Rosenbaum (1984, p. 243): "This leads to a system in which selections are 
continually occurring [to decide who will be promoted and who will be] 
eliminated from the tournament and moved into the category of loser, from 
which there is limited opportunity to advance." In Rosenbaum's 
tournament model of careers. "winners" are operationalized by time in 
rank--they are the employees who have been promoted early. Also, in 
place of strict elimination, the careers model posits a slower rate of 
promotion for "losers" and consequentially a lower peak rank at 
retirement. There are three implications of the model which can be 
examined with our data: (a) careers are structured in terms of a sequence 
of selections, (b) individuals with a short time-duration at one level 
are likely to be promoted rapidly from the next rank, and (c) there is 
little opportunity for "losers" to recover. Support for the tournament 
imagery in a large Japanese firm has been reported by Pucik (1985). 
Unfortunately, many of the implications of the tournament model 
also follow from a process of cumulative advantage, such as would occur 
from the sorting of employees in each corporate rank on the basis of 
ability or performance. Even without a notion of structured competition 
and the elimination of "losers," some workers will advance rapidly while 
others fall behind. In both formulations we should find that senior 
level employees progressively pulled ahead of their peers, having spent 
shorter durations in a rank and consequently having arrived at each 
successive status with less seniority. Rosenbaum (1984, pp. 265-267) 
attempted to disentangle the two models by associating the tournament 
formulation with a "labeling" process--rapid prior mobility signals an 
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employee's high potential, in contrast with reliance by management upon 
contemporaneous evaluations of performance--but this embellishment does 
not help to distinguish between the formulations with the personnel data 
available to us. 
A sponsorship model (Turner 1960; also see Rosenbaum 1984, p. 17), 
entails an early selection decision and the assignment of employees to 
two or more tracks. The selection determines an individual's prospects 
of eventually achieving a senior administrative rank. Contingent on the 
track assignment, an employee's subsequent performance--and his rate of 
promotion from mid-level ranks--is relatively unimportant. What counts 
is the early sorting decision, which may be followed by special job 
assignments and "grooming" for elite status. A gatekeeping operation 
suggests an analogous filtering process early in the career course. A 
minor distinction between the models is that "sponsorship" is usually 
associated with elite selection whereas "gatekeeping" suggests an 
objective of insuring minimum competence. Both models, however, involve 
a tracking decision at an initial career point. 
Turner (1960) also introduced the notion of contest mobility, in 
which decisions about elite status are delayed well into the career 
course, permitting employees an opportunity to overcome poor early 
evaluations or otherwise "grow with experience." Ballon's (1969a, pp. 
25-26) description of career dynamics in a large Japanese firm echoes 
this formulation, with his emphasis on time-in-rank prerequisites for 
advancement and his stress on the nuances of socialization ("proper 
organizational values"), in place of narrow work performance. The 
conclusion by Spilerman and Lunde (1991), from data on the U.S. firm, to 
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the effect that different talents become relevant to promotion decisions 
as one rises in the corporate hierarchy also supports this formulation. 
The above alternative models, or competing imageries, provide a 
framework for assessing the structure of the attainment process in the 
Japanese firm. In Table 4 we examine the effects of duration spells in 
prior ranks on the promotion rate. Column (1), a repeat of Table 2, 
Panel B, column (1), is presented for continuity with the earlier 
analysis and reports a significant negative effect of duration in rank 20 
(the trainee status) on the promotion rate in rank 30. Because the 
linear specification of the duration variable might be masking non-linear 
returns to different interval lengths, which would be revealing of the 
consequence of "early" and "late" promotions, we divided the duration 
variable into four categorical terms: early promotion, on-time promotion, 
13 late promotion, and very late promotion. "On-time," which is defined 
as the modal category, is the reference term. The results are reported 
in column (2). 
Table 4 about here 
Relative to "on-time" promotion, the tournament model would predict 
rapid advancement from rank 30 for employees who were promoted early from 
the prior rank ("winners"), and slow promotion for laggards. Our results 
make clear that laggards do, indeed, have poor advancement prospects, but 
they fail to show an advantage for early movers. It is also worth noting 
that the two laggard categories sum to only 15% of personnel (see note 
13); in short, rather than a process of gleaning the very best employees 
and preparing them for elite positions, the selection mechanism appears 
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to be oriented to eliminating the chaff--the small proportion of 
"recruitment errors." 
Columns (3) to (5) refer to promotion from rank 40. From column 
(3) we observe the effect of duration in rank 30--the prior status--to 
have no impact on the promotion rate. In column (4) we introduce a term 
for duration in rank 20, a repetition of the model in column (1), Panel C 
of Table 2. As explained in regard to that table, the present 
formulation is identical to a model containing variables for seniority 
and duration in the prior rank, though for reasons that have been noted 
the present representation is preferred. Even in the presence of this 
control we find no effect of duration in rank 30. This model does 
indicate, however, a continued negative effect of duration in the trainee 
status. In column (5) a model is reported in which the duration terms 
have been divided into categorical variables to ascertain whether the 
linear specifications have masked distinctive non-linear returns to 
13 particular duration intervals. Again, we fail to find an effect of 
duration in the prior grade. 
Taken together, these results do not support a tournament 
formulation or a cumulative advantage model as a description of the 
attainment process in the Japanese company. There is no evidence of 
sequential selections among "winners," as Rosenbaum (1984, p. 243) 
requires for the tournament model, nor an accumulation of rapid 
promotions by the presumably more able employees. Moreover, we fail to 
find any indication of a return to "winners," in that rapid mobility in 
the prior rank provides no discernable advantage over the modal rate of 
advancement. 
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If our results do not support a tournament model, they are 
consistent with a selection process in which an early tracking decision, 
based on evaluations during the trainee period, influences an employee's 
attainment prospects over the career course. Yet this selection 
mechanism does not appear to be one of anointing the most promising 
employees, rather it operates as a gatekeeping process that weeds out the 
least capable trainees. Contingent on this tracking decision, the 
promotion rate in the middle ranks does not appear consequential as a 
determinant of an employee's eventual peak status in the firm. 
The negative coefficients of early promotion in the prior status, 
which we observe in the dummy variable formulations of both the rank 30 
and rank 40 regressions, do not reach significance (columns 2 and 5). 
Nonetheless, if the data are organized somewhat differently we can 
observe that these are not chance effects, but arise from the very 
specification of promotion criteria in the company. 
In Table 5 we present a cross-tabulation of duration in rank 30 by 
duration in rank 20 (seniority at entrance into rank 30). Note first the 
diagonal in the upper left corner. It makes clear that there is a 
minimum requirement of 14 years seniority (duration in ranks 20 plus 30) 
before one can be considered for advancement to rank 40. As a 
consequence, employees promoted early from rank 20 (10 years duration) 
must wait four years before advancement, whereas slow movers from rank 20 
can be promoted again within a year. It is this seniority requirement 
which produces the negative effect of early promotion in the prior grade, 
noted in columns (2) and (5) of Table 4, and which undermines the 
possibility of a tournament/cumulative advantage process describing 
attainment in the firm. 
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Table 5 about here 
The rows and columns in Table 5 can be interpreted as deviations 
from their respective medians. In particular, the entries in the first 
four columns represent early promotions from grade 30. Thus, among 
employees who served 10 years in rank 20 (row 1), 33% (9/27) were 
promoted early from rank 30. Among employees with 11 years duration in 
rank 20, 47% were promoted early from grade 30. For 12 years service the 
early promotion rate is also 47%; and for 13 or more years in rank 20 it 
is 72%. To emphasize that these results are not idiosyncratic of the 
particular rank, we report in Table 6 an analogous cross-tabulation 
between seniority at entrance into rank 40 and duration in rank 40. The 
effects are almost identical to those reported in Table 5. 
Table 6 about here 
To summarize, these findings run counter to a contention that rapid 
advancement from one rank increases an employee's prospects of early 
promotion in the next rank--an imagery that underlies both the tournament 
model and the cumulative advantage process. Instead, as a consequence of 
the firm's promotion rules, we find a tendency for short durations to be 
coupled with long stays in the succeeding rank. Pucik (1985) concluded 
that a tournament model adequately fits career evolution in the Japanese 
company he studied, however we do not find support for this imagery. 
Moreover, the specification of a seniority minimum for rank entrance 
(sometimes, an age minimum) has been reported by other investigators of 
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Japanese industrial practices (e.g., Yoshino and Lifson 1986, p.147; 
Marsh and Mannari 1976, chap. 7; also see Koike 1988, pp. 210-215 for a 
comparison between Japan and European countries). Thus, even though our 
assessment is based on data from a single firm, it is unlikely that a 
tournament/cumulative advantage model is widely applicable in the 
Japanese industrial context. 
Advancement to senior ranks. What more can be said about the 
attainment process? In particular, what can be ascertained about the 
selection of senior personnel--the rank 60 managers? Table 7 speaks to 
this question, as well as providing summary information about career 
dynamics. These data examine current (1993) status for employees hired 
during the time interval 1962-67--the entry cohorts that are approaching 
retirement age. Since we do not have data on personnel who have left 
employment, this sample provides our best insight into the achievement of 
high level position. Table 7 describes current status, contingent on 
seniority at entrance into lower ranks. 
Table 7 about here 
With respect to seniority at entrance into rank 30 (duration in 
rank 20), there is a clear division in terms of prospects for reaching 
status 60 (Panel A). On-time entrants (specified by median seniority) 
and early entrants are twice as likely as late arrivals to achieve this 
level. However, there is no advantage to rapid prior advancement--
"winners" in Rosenbaum's formulation--nor is there a special disadvantage 
to laggards, the very slowest category. In this specification of the 
seniority categories, some 65% of employees are in the two groups that 
show superior prospects for reaching rank 60. 
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Panel B reports the likelihood of reaching the different 1993 
ranks, contingent on seniority at entrance into status 40. Focusing on 
status 60, we again see evidence of a step function effect: little 
apparent difference in the attainment prospects of "early," "on-time," or 
"moderately tardy" employees, as measured by prior rate of advancement, 
but a clear disadvantage to "laggards" (15% of the sample), who exhibit 
less than half the rate of reaching status 60 than in the other 
categories. 
Thus, in ranks 30 and 40, the advancement regime appears to operate 
as a gatekeeping process which does not differentiate between rapid and 
average movers, nor (in rank 40) between these groups and modestly tardy 
employees, with respect to prospects for achieving elite status. A 
minority of employees are penalized, namely those with very slow rates of 
prior mobility, yet, even here, there is substantial opportunity for 
recovery, which is not a feature of the tournament imagery (Rosenbaum 
1984, p.42). Some 20 - 30 percent of the "laggard" category do succeed 
in reaching the highest status. 
Promotion from status 50 exhibits a different pattern. Whereas, in 
lower ranks, the advancement regime appears to operate by curtailing the 
attainments of a minority of laggards (a gatekeeping operation), we now 
see evidence of progressive differentiation in terms of prior service (or 
age ). In particular, employees who have progressed the most rapidly to 
rank 50 have the best prospects of reaching rank 60; the slower the prior 
progression, the poorer an individual's chances. 
In regard to conceptual imagery, these findings add up to what can 
be considered a two-step process. First, a screening or gate-keeping 
decision is made in lower grades to weed out poor performers, as indexed 
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by very slow rates of prior mobility. The remaining employees--perhaps 
80% of an entry cohort--are not differentiated with respect to prospects 
for attaining the senior status, as they move through the middle ranks of 
the organization. Possibly, this is intended to maintain morale by 
avoiding an early labeling of employees as "winners" and "losers"--an 
understandable strategy in an organization in which demoralized workers 
cannot be dismissed. Possibly, as Ballon (1969a, pp. 25-26) has 
contended, elite selection is delayed because the ability to perform 
senior tasks effectively is only revealed late in the career course. At 
any rate, it is only at the second stage, promotion from rank 50, where 
there is clear evidence of a graduated return to prior mobility and where 
length of service is an effective indicator of prospects for attaining 
the highest status. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In contrast with Pucik's (1984b; 1985) assessment of the attainment 
process, we find little evidence to support the imagery of a tournament 
model of careers in the Japanese financial service company. As we have 
noted, in a context of lifetime employment it makes sense for a firm to 
delay revealing (and perhaps deciding) who will be permitted to reach the 
highest ranks. Other elements of the reward structure--such as seniority 
based compensation, with only small additions to salary for achieved 
rank--also contribute to the cohesion and morale of the workforce. 
There have been suggestions of impending change in the structure of 
career rewards in Japanese industry, such as hiring experienced workers 
and increasing salary payments for achieved rank (e.g., Cole 1971, chaps. 
3,4; Marsh and Mannari 1976, pp. 307-314). However, in the firm we have 
studied there is little evidence to suggest much movement away from the 
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kind of reward structure that was described some 25 years ago (e.g., 
Ballon 1969b). Moreover, because of the interrelation of the component 
features of the reward structure, we suspect that when change does come 
it will not be gradual or piecemeal. 
Finally, what can be said about who achieves elite status? 
Actually very little. There is markedly little differentiation among 
employees through rank 40, in part because the entry cohorts are 
homogeneous with respect to education, age, gender, and (lack of) prior 
experience. In the later career stages, where differentiation does take 
place, it appears to reflect subtle considerations of "suitability" and 
values (Ballon 1969a, chapter 1) in addition to job performance--measures 
that are not usually present in the personnel records made available to 
researchers. Interestingly, there is also evidence from the U.S. 
financial service company (Spilerman and Lunde 1991) that the role of 
education in promotion decisions is weaker in high corporate ranks than 
in the middle levels. There, too, it was argued that the criteria for 
effective performance are quite different for elite managers than for 
mid-level employees, that considerations of social style and personality 
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2. In Japan, size of firm is a key differentiating variable in the 
stratification system. Both the status characteristics of workers 
(educational attainment, household wealth) and the rewards of employment 
(occupational prestige, income) are more favorable for employees of large 
companies (Ishida 1993, pp. 208-226). 
3. Koike (1991), in one of the few studies which addressed the 
issue of specialization and skill formation in Japanese companies, 
documents the practice of specialization among white-collar workers but 
also shows that employees tend to experience a broad range of jobs within 
a specialty. 
4. We note that there is a counterpart literature with respect to 
attainment in western firms which argues that the personality demands of 
jobs at different organizational levels can be quite distinct. Moreover, 
the character type and coping style of an employee that is effective in 
low organizational ranks may be dysfunctional in higher grades (Silver 
and Spilerman 1991). 
5. Since enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law in 1986 
women have moved into the managerial ranks in Japan, although they are 
still very few in number. Only one percent of career-track employees in 
the financial service company are women. 
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6. We lack data on employment history prior to entry into the U.S. 
firm. This estimate is based on the proportion of hires who are age 25 
and older. 
7. The Japanese company uses the term "non-management employees" 
and these workers are placed in the lifetime queue from the time of 
employment. We prefer the term "trainees" because this is the better 
fitting description in the American context. These workers are not 
promoted from lesser positions based on performance but are hired 
directly into this fixed-duration status from which most will progress to 
management positions. 
8. It is more common to introduce "seniority" and "duration in 
prior rank" as the temporal variables. In a model with exactly two prior 
ranks, as in the Panel C regressions, this specification can be obtained 
by a simple transformation of the reported covariates, since "seniority" 
= "duration in rank 20" + "duration in rank 30". In particular, the 
model equivalent to column (1) has coefficients for seniority and 
duration in rank 30 equal to -.0397** and .0350**, respectively . The 
negative effect of seniority on the promotion rate makes sense in terms 
of the reports of other researchers (e.g., Rosenbaum 1984, pp. 169-170); 
the positive effect of duration in the prior grade is less comprehensible 
until one observes that, with seniority held constant, a positive 
duration in rank 30 is equivalent to a negative duration in rank 2 0 — 
which is the effect we report. Our presentation of the two duration 
terms as covariates, in place of seniority and duration in prior rank, 
permits a more direct interpretation of the findings. 
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9. Entertainment allowances are omitted from this investigation. 
Since they increase with rank, our results somewhat underestimate the 
true rank effects on monthly salary. 
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10. Despite the small increase in R in moving from equation (2) to 
equation (3), the set of added terms is highly significant based on a 
conventional F-test. 
11. This value is calculated from the monthly salary data and is 
somewhat smaller than the regression-based multipliers reported in the 
preceding paragraph. Note, also, that while Pucik (1984a, 1984b) applies 
the term "salary compression" to the small salary dispersion found when 
seniority is held constant, our comparison refers to unadjusted salary 
figures. 
12. Part of the reason for the stability in compensation practices 
derives from the fact that the Japanese company is in the financial 
service sector. The seniority component of compensation has been 
traditionally high in this industry (Higuchi 1991). 
13. The duration in rank 20 terms are defined as follows: "early 
promotion" (10 years in rank) contains 18% of observations, "on-time 
promotion" (11 years) contains 66% of observations, "late promotion" (12 
years) contains 12% of observations, and "very late promotion" (13 or 
more years in rank) contains 3% of observations. There were no 
promotions before 10 years in rank. 
14. The duration in rank 30 categories are defined as follows: 
"early promotion" (1-3 years in rank) contains 14% of observations, "on-
time promotion" (4 years) contains 36% of observations, "late promotion" 
(5 years) contains 35% of observations, and "very late promotion" (6 or 
more years in rank) contains 16% of observations. "On-time" promotion, 
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which is defined as the modal category, is the reference term in the 
regressions. 
15. How material is the exclusion of incomplete spells from Tables 
5 and 6? This has no consequence with respect to the diagonal pattern in 
the upper left corner of the tables because the diagonals derive from 
short durations in the adjacent grades. The exclusion of long spells is 
potentially more serious, but an examination of incomplete spells 
(durations in current state) reveals no major disparities from the 
results we have presented. 
16. There is much lumpiness in the data, which permits little 
flexibility in the assignment to seniority categories. In particular, 
148 employees were promoted exactly 11 years after entrance into the 
company. Similarly, about 95% of employees in the next category were 
promoted at exactly the 144 month point. Thus, there is no possibility 
for exploring the sensitivity of the reported findings to the seniority 
category boundaries. Note, also, that no employee was promoted to rank 
30 with less than 10 years service. 
17. Because of the small age variance in each entry cohort, the 
argument of this section, which stresses seniority, can be formulated 
equivalently in terms of employee age. 
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